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1.
Technologies have represented and still represent a development of freedoms; 
more in details, freedoms have significantly extended their scope to new fron­
tiers of human acting by virtue of the recent technological developments1. 
Indeed, technologies do not only produce freedom: it would be better to say 
that technologies can be employed by good and bad individuals, as well as by 
either an open-minded government or a despotic one. In a constitutional and 
liberal state, however, public policy should always be aimed at fostering and 
extending individuals’ freedoms, and the use of technologies must be one of 
the strategic tools to this end. Let’s think about the Internet and its typical 
cross-border nature, which goes across national borders, overcomes customs 
boundaries and removes cultural differences between various people.2
Also, with respect to the Internet, it is still a problem to distinguish the 
different freedoms in order to achieve a holistic model of freedom: whoever 
has access to the Internet, in fact, expresses himself/herself, joins communi­
ties, communicates, in the manners that he/she prefers. Different freedoms 
are therefore enforced by the same medium, i.e. the Internet, at the same 
time or at very closed times. Of course, there is another point in return: 
virtual barriers are raised instead of real barriers. In fact, there are some coun­
tries (illiberal, of course) that have built electronic barriers in order to avoid 
the access to part of their global network, by the removal of words, names, 
and keywords from search engines or by violating personal data of individu­
1 See: T.E. Frossini, Nuevas tecnologias y  constitucionalism o, “Revista de Estudios Politicos” 2004,
No. 124, p. 129; recently: P. Constanzo, I l  fa tto r e  tecn ologico e  le  sue conseguenze, “Rassegna
Parlamentare” 2012, No. 4.
2 V. Frossini, L’orizzonte g iu r id ico  d ellIn tern et, “Il diritto dell’informazione e dell’informatica”
2000, No. 2, p. 271.
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als. New information barriers have been raised in part of the world, where 
videos or blogs are the sam izdat of the present days. These factors, however, 
confirm the liberal spirit of the Internet, and the fear by which non-tolerant 
countries approach technologies, because they feel the Internet as a threat 
to their absolute power. The Internet can be -  as it was, for example, in the 
so called “Arab spring” -  an important tool for increasing democracy, also 
because it guarantees the transparency of the political acting by a pluralism 
of news and information which circulate over the Internet, allowing citizens 
to see-know-share.
2.
It has to be pointed out that the problems brought along by technological de­
velopments are not limited to the protection of the right to privacy anymore, 
even if this problem has been and continues to be analyzed from the consti­
tutional point of view, by both scholars and courts (including data protection 
authorities). The “legal horizon of the Internet” includes the right to privacy, 
of course, but such background extends also to the freedom of expression, 
which is a constitutional right to be rethought in light of its new implications 
from a legal point of view.
In order to examine the most critical issues concerning the coming of 
the Internet and its legal implications, I believe that some points have to be 
made with respect to the “informatic freedom”. This theory was developed in 
1981 and found its grounds in the concept of a new liberal age, characterized 
by the new achievements permitted by the technological “revolution”. Such 
doctrine was based on the rise of a new dimension of the personal liberty in 
the age when computer were used for the first time.3
The informatic freedom is therefore a new right resulted from the evolu­
tion of technological society, and shows a new aspect of the well-established 
idea of personal liberty and constitutes the advancement of a new frontier of 
human freedom to the society of the future to be placed in the construction 
of the contemporary constitutionalism.
The informatic freedom qualifies as a new form of the traditional right of 
personal liberty, as the right to exercise the control over personal information, 
or a right to “habeas data”. Over the time, case law has recognized and af­
firmed this new freedom in terms of preservation of the individual, as a claim
3 Idem, L aprotez ione d ella  riservatezza nella societd  in form atica  [1981], now on book: idem, In - 
form atica , d iritto e  societd, 2° ed., Milano 1992, p. 173. See, in english, idem, Law a n d  Liberty 
in  th e C om puter Age. The H arvard Papers, Oslo 1995.
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against the holders of the computer power, by private persons and public 
authorities. By the new legislation on the protection of individuals with re­
gard to the processing of personal data, fostered by a European standard, the 
notion of the right to informatic freedom has been recognized in positive 
law. The freedom to preserve their confidentiality when using computer has 
become also the freedom to communicate to others the information trans­
mitted by electronic means to exercise that freedom of expression of one's 
personality making use of new communication systems.
Hence the right to informatic freedom acquires an additional significance 
nowadays as a result of the coming of the Internet, and this proves its rel­
evance even today. In fact, in the age of the Internet, the right to informatic 
freedom has become a claim of freedom in the active sense, not a freedom 
“from” but freedom “of”, which is the freedom to make use of computer to 
provide and obtain information of any kind.
And it is a right to participate in the virtual society, which has been cre­
ated by the coming of computer in the digital age: it is a society characterized 
by movable parts and dynamic relationships, where each participant is sover­
eign over his/her decisions’.
It is, then, the right to join the digital society that has been created. We 
are approaching, without doubts, a new form of freedom, i.e. the right to 
communicate to whoever, including the right to circulate personal opinions, 
thoughts and materials, as well as the right to receive the same.
Therefore, freedom of communication qualifies as a right to circulate and 
receive. This is not only the individual freedom of expression anymore, rather 
the right to establish relationships, circulate and request information, and 
therefore exercise the new power of knowledge based on the information 
technology: in a nutshell, the right to exercise the informatic freedom. Mov­
ing from the acknowledgement of such a freedom it could be possible to 
establish some grounds for an In tern et B ill o f  Rights.
3.
Then we come to the right to access to the Internet. It is worth quoting 
Rifkin, first of all: «In a world more and more based on economic and social 
electronic networks, the right not to be excluded -  the right to access -  ac­
quires an increasing importance. Concepts like “inclusion” and “access” have 
today replaced those (corresponding) of autonomy and possession, which 
characterized the notion of property in a traditional sense: in the new econ­
omy, the concept of property does not refer to a power of excluding others
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from enjoying personal goods anymore, rather it qualifies as a right to not be 
excluded from the society’s resources».4
The right to access to the Internet has therefore to be considered as a so­
cial right, or better as an ind iv idua l claim  to a states perform ance, like services 
such as education, health and welfare. It is a universal service that state’s bodies 
must guarantee to their citizens by investments of public resources, social and 
educational policies. In fact, more and more the access to the Internet and the 
conduct of business via the Internet constitute the means by which individuals 
enter into relations with state’s powers, i.e. exercise their citizenship’s rights5.
Today, citizenship is a digital concept. It is interesting, in this respect, to 
look at the provisions contained in the Italian Code of Digital Administra­
tion (CAD) -  Legislative Decree No. 82/2005, which establishes “a statute of 
the digital citizen” (including natural and legal persons), by requiring public 
offices, agencies and bodies to interact in a digital manner, thus to arrange 
appropriate means from the technical and organizational point of view to 
meet citizens’ requests. It is clear that such a new way of qualifying the re­
lationship between individuals and public administration in terms of a new 
digital citizenship demands a process of digital literacy, as a social right that 
the state must guarantee, along with the right to education and to the digital 
cultural development, that the Italian Constitutional Court (by decision n. 
307, 2004) has found to be «corresponding to a general interest, specifically 
the development of culture -  by the use of digital tools-, that Italy must 
pursue at any levels (art. 9)». In this respect, it is worth mentioning the Euro­
pean Parliament resolution of 10 April 2008, requiring Member States to «to 
recognize that the Internet is a vast platform for cultural expression, access 
to knowledge, and democratic participation in European creativity, bringing 
generations together through the information society; calls on the Commis­
sion and the Member States, to avoid adopting measures conflicting with 
civil liberties and human rights and with the principles of proportionality, 
effectiveness and dissuasiveness, such as the interruption of Internet access». 
Also in the European Parliament recommendation of 26 March 2009 to the 
Council on strengthening security and fundamental freedoms on the Inter­
net it is stressed that the Internet is «a key instrument at world level for ex­
ercising freedom of expression» protected under the Charter of fundamental 
rights of the European Union and « can be an extraordinary opportunity to 
enhance active citizenship».
4 J. Rifkin, The Age o f  Access: The N ew Culture o f  Hypercapitalism, Where AH o f  Life is Paid-For
Experience, New York 2000.
5 A. Lepage, Liberies e t  droits fondam en taux  ä  Vepreuve d e  Vinternet, Paris 2002, p. 61.
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Yet, in terms of (digital) active citizenship, it is worth quoting the Italian 
Law No. 4/2004 (so called “Stanca Law”), establishing provisions for favour­
ing the access of disabled people to computer systems. This law recognizes 
and protects the right of any persons to access any sources of information 
and the related services, including those provided by computer systems. In 
particular, art. 1 refers to art. 3 of the Italian Constitution when setting the 
right to access to the Internet, by qualifying such right as instrumental for 
the achievement of equality among citizens. Therefore, denying access to the 
Internet would result in the violation of fundamental human rights such as 
freedom of expression, freedom of information, education, development and 
equality6. Then, the right to access to the Internet amounts to a fundamental 
right the exercise of which is instrumental to the enjoyment of other consti­
tutional rights and freedoms: not only the freedom of expression, protected 
by art. 21 of the Italian Constitution, but also the right to an “appropriate 
development of the human being” and to an “effective participation to the 
political, economic and social life of the State” protected under art. 3 of the 
Constitution, as well as the freedom of conduct business contained in art. 41. 
Today, against the background of the information society (or the “age of the 
access”) being deprived of access to the Internet results in being prevented 
from exercising large part of the citizenship rights.
In Finland, a law that came into force on 1st July 2010 has defined as 
“a legal right” the access to the Internet for over five millions of citizens. The 
Finnish Minister of Communication said that «a high-quality broadband In­
ternet connection at a reasonable price is an essential right». Therefore, all the 
26 providers operating in Finland, that are qualified as “provider of a univer­
sal service”, shall be able to connect any facilities with a dow n load  speed of 
1 m egab it per second. Also Switzerland and Spain are looking at this initia­
tive, and may act in the next future in order to grant access to the Internet as 
a condition for the enjoyment of other rights.
4.
Some countries have recognized the access to the Internet as a fundamental 
right of individuals in the relevant legal systems, even if at different levels: 
some in the constitutions, like Estonia, Greece and Ecuador; some by laws, 
like Finland and Peru; some by the case law of the respective domestic courts, 
like France, Costa Rica and -even before- the United States, where the Su­
preme Court, in a decision delivered in 1997, said that «The record demon­
6 See recently: O.D. Pulvirenti, Derechos Humanos e  Internet, Buenos Aires 2013.
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strates that the growth of the Internet has been and continues to be phenom­
enal. As a matter of constitutional tradition, in the absence of evidence to the 
contrary, we presume that governmental regulation of the content of speech 
is more likely to interfere with the free exchange of ideas than to encourage 
it. The interest in encouraging freedom of expression in a democratic society 
outweighs any theoretical but unproven benefit of censorship»7.
W ith regard to the decision of the French Conseil C onstitutionnel (no. 
2009-580 DC of10 June 2009), it has to be stressed that the court referred to 
the access to the Internet in terms of a fundamental right. In fact, due to the 
large-scale diffusion of the Internet, the freedom of communication and ex­
pression necessarily requires a free access to online communication services. 
The Conseil moves from an express reference to art. 11 of the Declaration of 
the Rights of Man and of the Citizen of 1789: «The free communication of 
ideas and opinions is one of the most precious of the rights of man. Every 
citizen may, accordingly, speak, write, and print with freedom, but shall be 
responsible for such abuses of this freedom as shall be defined by law». This 
definition provides a clear and specific view of the freedom of information 
and still proves to be valid. Then, the Conseil, by the application of the pro­
portionality test, found that the freedom of communication, including the 
right to access to communication services, has a valuable importance and 
therefore any restriction of the same imposed by the competent authorities 
must be specifically defined8.
Also, some international (also non-binding) documents concern the right 
to access to the Internet. It is worth quoting, for example, a May 2011 report 
issued by the General Assembly of the United Nations where it is highlighted 
that «given that the Internet has become an indispensable tool for realizing 
a range of human rights, combating inequality, and accelerating develop­
ment and human progress, ensuring universal access to the Internet should 
be a priority for all States».
5.
In the 21st Century the «legal horizon of the Internet» is clear and visible. 
And this constitutes also the new horizon of contemporary constitutional­
ism, as the aforesaid important decisions of the US Supreme Court first and 
of the French Conseil C onstitutionnel then, have proven (without forgetting
7 See: American Civil Liberties Union vs. Reno [E.D. pa 1996]; Supreme Court 521 US 844
(1997).
8 L. Marino, Le d ro it d ’acces d  internet, nouveau d ro it fondam en ta l, “Recueil Dalloz” 2009, No. 30,
p. 2045.
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the decisions, already mentioned, of the Sala C onstitucional of Costa Rica). 
It is interesting to observe, in two countries where the constitutionalism was 
born, even though by following different paths at the very beginning, the in­
terpretation given by courts to two dated provisions -  the First Amendment 
to the US Constitution and art. 11 of the 1789 Declaration-, provisions 
which were written and adopted more than two centuries ago to protect and 
enforce the freedom of information: that’s the case to say, the freedom of 
yesterday, today and tomorrow. In fact, it is from these provisions -  defining 
clear horizons of the constitutionalism- that today a legal ground is sought 
in order to recognize and protect the new forms of expressions of electronic 
communications, with respect in particular to the Internet. Thanks to an ap­
propriate interpretation and enforcement of the relevant parameters, a very 
con stitu tiona l r igh t  to access to the In tern et is emerging nowadays9. And this is 
because, against the extensive diffusion of the Internet, the freedom of com­
munication and expression requires first the freedom to access to those online 
communication services. It is for states to remove barriers and obstacles that 
prevent citizens from enjoying this universal service that must be guaranteed 
to all citizens by public investments, social and educational policies, by pub­
lic expenses. As pointed out, the right to access to the Internet constitutes 
in fact the way by which individuals approach state’s powers. Denying the 
access to the Internet, or making it costly, excluding part of citizens from its 
enjoyment would make it impossible to exercise a large part of the citizenship 
rights.
Finally: the constitutional freedom of expression consists of what art. 19 
of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen of indicated in 
the right: «to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any 
media and regardless of frontiers», even when- like in the recent “WikiLeaks” 
case -  the information circulating via the Internet may disappoint national 
governments, put at risk diplomatic relationship between states or reveal ar­
cana imperii. One could not like it, and also reduce the scope of protection 
and the effects or deny the legal validity, but in any cases the act of “seeking, 
receiving and imparting information” demonstrates the crucial role of the 
right to know and the freedom of information, that also show a new model 
of separation of powers in light of a modern constitutional view.
In the past, it was the government to control citizens by the control over 
information; today, it has become harder and harder to control what a citizen
9 See: T.E. Frossini, I l  d iritto costituzionale d i accesso a  Internet, [in:] Studi in onore d i F. M odugno, 
Vol. 2, Napoli 2011, p. 121; idem, La lotta p e r  i  diritti. Le ragion i d e l  costituzionalismo, Napoli 
2011, p. 230.
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reads-sees-hears, seeks-receives-imparts. The technology provides thus to in­
dividuals the ability to become a power that is in the condition to control the 
other powers: le p o u v o ir  a rret lep ou vo ir .
Abstrakt
Wobec dynamicznego rozwoju sieci Internet, swoboda komunikacji i wypowiedzi wy­
maga również swobody dostępu do usług internetowych. Istotne jest pytanie dotyczące 
charakteru i treści prawa dostępu do internetu. Odmówienie dostępu do internetu lub 
podniesienie jego ceny, wykluczające część obywateli z kręgu użytkowników, mogłoby 
być traktowane jako uniemożliwienie korzystania z części praw obywatelskich.
Słowa kluczowe: prawa obywatelskie, dostęp do Internetu, swoboda komunikacji
